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Abstract 
 
In discussion of mechanisms, philosophers often debate about whether quantitative 
descriptions of generalizations or qualitative descriptions of operations are explanatorily 
fundamental.  I argue that these debates have erred by conflating the explanatory roles of 
generalizations and patterns.  Patterns are types of quantitative relationships that hold 
between quantities in a mechanism, over time and/or across conditions.  While these patterns 
must often be represented in addition to descriptions of operations in order to explain a 
phenomenon, they are not equivalent to generalizations, because their explanatory role does 
not depend on any specific facts about their scope or domain of invariance.    
Real Patterns in Biological Explanation 
1. Introduction 
Scientists often claim to have identified patterns in the world.  In this paper, I will argue that 
these patterns are often explanatory in biology, and that their roles in explanation are distinct 
from the respective roles normally posited for operations and generalizations in discussion of 
mechanistic explanation.  Operations are types of causal interactions between the parts of a 
mechanism, described qualitatively.  Generalizations are quantitative descriptions of 
regularities, that normally are taken to involve (at least) two distinct properties in addition to 
the quantitative relationship.  First is scope: applicability to a range of cases.  Second is 
domain of invariance: insensitivity to manipulations of variables other than those named in 
the generalization (Woodward, 2010).   
Theorists have almost universally equated patterns and regularities, and thus 
supposed that the explanatory roles of patterns are equivalent to those played by 
generalizations.  For instance, Craver and Kaiser (2013) claim that regularities are “statistical 
patterns of dependence and independence among magnitudes,” (p. 128) and that 
generalizations describe regularities.  Dennett (1991), in his seminal discussion of patterns, 
calls them a “variety of regularity” (p. 40).  Woodward (2010) says that causal relationships 
are “patterns of dependency” that are “stable or invariant” (p. 291).  Most of the literature has 
followed a similar assumption.   
I claim that the explanatory role of patterns is distinct from those of operations and 
generalizations, and thus that patterns should be considered their own explanatory category.   
Patterns, for current purposes, are type-able variations within or between quantities.  When 
biologists cite patterns, they say that a quantity of type X exhibits a particular type of 
quantitative variation, or that the variations of quantity X stand in a certain type of relation to 
variations of quantity Y.1  I will mainly focus on inter-quantity relations here.  Often it is 
important that these relationships occur across conditions and/or over time—examples 
include two variations being proportional to each other or in phase with one another.1  I will 
discuss instances of explanation that employ these kinds of relationships, which I have 
elsewhere (Burnston, 2016) called “explanatory relations.”  The patterns cited in explaining 
with these relations are distinct from operations, since they consist in quantitative rather than 
qualitative types, and since knowledge of the patterns is not fully specified by knowledge of 
operations.  But they are also explanatorily distinct from generalizations, since their 
explanatory role does not depend on any specific facts about the scope or domain of 
invariance of the relationships instantiating the pattern.   
The initial payoff is simply descriptive adequacy: keeping distinct explanatory 
categories distinct.  I also have a larger target in mind, however.  There is currently a 
considerable amount of debate about whether operations or generalizations are explanatorily 
fundamental—i.e., does one explain the other, or vice versa.  “Generalizationists” cite, 
                                                 
1 While I mean this definition very liberally—the fact that a quantity “increases” in a certain condition is a 
pattern in this sense—it certainly won’t exhaust all colloquial, or perhaps even scientific uses of the concept of 
a pattern.  For instance, one might suggest that one’s friend exhibits a negative pattern of behavior without 
trying to quantify it.  Moreover, many patterns are simply statistical facts about a given sample (e.g., noise is 
“white” only when it has a constant spectral density).  Finally, there may also be an infinite number of patterns 
that are not type-able by us.  But I’m inclined to think that we need to type a pattern before it can be useful in 
science, and I will assume that here.   
 
among other considerations, the need for regular quantitative relationships to hold before one 
can call something an operation (Leuridan, 2010).  “Operationists” cite the need for 
qualitative descriptions of types of relationships in explaining why regularities hold 
(Andersen, 2011; Machamer, 2004).  I think the fundamentality question is, in general, a bad 
one (cf. Tabery, 2004).  In showing that patterns play a distinct role from either operations or 
generalizations, I hope to suggest that no category is fundamental.  This results in a variety of 
contextualism about explanation.   
My strategy is as follows.  I will first (section 2) discuss several cases in which 
biologists explain by representing patterns.  In section 3.1, I will argue that this aspect of 
explanation is distinct from representing operations.  I will then (section 3.2) take up a thread 
in the dialectic between operationists and generalizationists to show that patterns are distinct 
from generalizations.  Some operationists  have argued that generalizations are not 
fundamental for explanation, since we often want to explain in singular or statistically 
unlikely cases, which involve highly restricted scope and domain of invariance.  I will argue 
that even in cases like these, biologists still need to represent patterns.  Hence, operationists 
are wrong to exclude patterns on the grounds of rarity, and generalizationists are wrong to 
insist that patterns explain in virtue of having a particular scope or domain of invariance.  In 
both cases, the error is due to equating the explanatory role of patterns and generalizations.  I 
then close (section 4) by suggesting that which explanatory category is most important 
depends on explanatory context, and thus that there is no fundamentality between 
explanatory them.  As should be clear, my focus is primarily on epistemic concerns.  While 
the debates about fundamentality discussed above often address both the metaphysics and 
epistemology of mechanisms, it is productive to keep analysis of these issues separate (Levy, 
2013), as I will show below.   
I draw my examples from mammalian chronobiology.  Chronobiologists study 
circadian rhythms—roughly 24 hour, endogenously produced physiological rhythms which 
regulate a large number of processes in the body, ranging from sleep and cognitive abilities, 
to feeding behaviors, to gene expression.  Many organisms have biological “clock” 
mechanisms within individual cells, which operate on the principle of negative feedback in 
gene regulation networks.  In mammals, the intracellular clock consists in gene regulation 
between a “negative” loop consisting of the genes Per and Cry and their respective products 
(mRNAs and proteins), and a “positive loop” consisting of Bmal1 and Clock and their 
respective products.  In outline, it works as follows.  Positive loop proteins bind to E-box 
promoters on the negative loop genes, activating their transcription.  After translation outside 
of the nucleus, the negative loop proteins dimerize and are translocated back inside of the 
nucleus, where they bind to the positive loop genes on their own promoters, thus inhibiting 
their own transcription.  As the negative loop proteins degrade, this inhibition is released and 
the cycle can begin again.  With the right rates of transcription, translation, and degradation, 
these oscillations can occur over a roughly 24 hour period, hence providing a clock signal 
that can regulate other physiological processes.  The clock mechanism is represented in the 
following diagram.   
 Figure 1.  The mammalian intracellular clock mechanism.  Modified from Wang, Zhang, Xu, 
and Tischkau (2014). 
In the mechanism, the important parts include the genes and their assorted promoter 
regions, gene products, the nuclear membrane, etc.  The key operations include the activation 
and inhibition of transcription via selective binding.  There are a variety of more complex 
aspects to the clock mechanism.  The products of the positive loop gene Bmal1 also oscillate, 
due to a subsidiary feedback loop mediated by Rev-erb and Ror products.  In addition, there 
are more gene products involved that play support roles, and more types of promoters.  
Particularly, D-box and RRE (Rev-erb response element) promoters serve as binding sites for 
a variety of proteins, and each of the promoters can regulate several different genes.  Finally, 
several of the clock genes have paralogs—structurally similar genes that serve related 
functions in the clock. 
While the canonical mechanism schema for the mammalian clock, including the parts 
and operations, has been largely agreed upon since the early 2000s (Zhang & Kay, 2010), 
investigation into the mechanism has continued—to a significant extent, investigators have 
turned towards discovering quantitative relationships within the mechanism.  In the cases 
discussed below, I argue that the representation of quantitative patterns over time and across 
conditions is necessary for explaining certain circadian phenomena.  In particular I will focus 
on temporal patterns regarding phase relationships and proportional responses in gene 
networks underlying compensation. 
2.  Patterns in Explanation 
2.1.  Phase relationships.   
While the mechanistic picture given above is necessary for explaining rhythmicity, it 
is not sufficient.  Several subsequent investigations have shown that it is not only that the 
mechanism operates according to the schema above that is important, but also that key 
quantities in the mechanisms bear particular temporal relationships to each other.  Looking 
for these relationships involved measuring and conceptualizing data in certain ways not 
entailed just by knowing the mechanistic organization.   
One such important relationship was discovered by Ueda et al. (2005), who decided 
to look at the temporal relationships between the activations of gene promoter types as 
such—meaning, regardless of the particular genes that they regulated.  Since each type of 
promoter occurs on multiple distinct genes, analysis of promoters had generally taken a back 
seat to the study of the genes themselves.  However, Ueda et al. showed that the particular 
patterns of activity for each promoter type are important for explaining how an entire cell can 
oscillate in the quantities of its gene products.  They first noticed that all of the different 
activators of a particular promoter type tended to hit their peak expression at similar times, 
and the same for its repressors.  Moreover, for each promoter type—E-boxes, D-boxes, and 
RREs—there is a distinct phase relationship between their activators and inhibitors.  This 
suggested to the researchers two ideas: (i) that each promoter of a given type is activated in 
phase with other promoters of the same type, even if they regulate different genes; and (ii) 
that each type of promoter should have a particular phase of peak activation.  This is indeed 
what they found—E-boxes are most active in the morning, D-boxes during the day, and 
RREs in the evening.   
Ueda et al. claimed a functional import for these relationships.  Since the clock 
mechanism consists in a large number of interspersed gene relationships, the phasic 
regulation of particular promoters across all of the components can keep the many diverse 
gene interactions on a coherent schedule.  For current purposes, however, the explanatory 
import of the patterns is most clear in a subsequent study by Ukai-Tadenuma et al. (2011).  
They showed that through very fine-grained manipulation of the Cry1 D-box, they could 
manipulate the phase of Cry1 expression, advancing or delaying it relative to normal D-box 
mediated expression.  Only a phase of D-box-mediated transcription close to wild-type 
would produce normal cellular rhythms.  So, the relative phases of the individual promoter 
types help to explain how the cell as a whole produces coherent wild-type rhythms. 
Importantly, Ukai-Tadenuma did not manipulate the operation performed by the D-
box—it still regulated Cry1 just as normal.  Instead, they manipulated the particular temporal 
pattern of its regulation.  So, not only must the particular parts, operations, and causal 
organization of the mechanism be in place for it to work, but it must also have these elements 
coordinated according to the appropriate temporal patterns.  Put simply, if the mechanism did 
not exhibit this particular set of temporal relations between its promoters, it would not 
oscillate, and learning this fact was an important addition to the explanation, overtop of the 
standard mechanism schema given in the clock model.  What, then, is the explanatory role 
being played by the pattern?  I suggest that it is adverbial (cf. Burnston, 2016).  A 
mechanistic description shows what the operations are and shows the causal organization of 
their interactions.  The representation of patterns shows how these interactions are 
coordinated in their levels and timing to produce quantitative phenomena like rhythmicity.  
The next example will further illustrate this role.   
2.2.  Proportionality and compensation. 
Baggs et al.  sought to study an important phenomenon related to molecular clocks, 
namely that of compensation.  In noisy molecular networks, shifts above and below normal 
quantities of key components are common, but can also be problematic—as shown above, for 
instance, the clock requires precise temporal coordination of gene product levels in the 
mechanism.  Baggs et al. (2009) showed that compensation in clock mechanisms relies both 
on their particular mechanistic organization and on the particular patterns of change in 
quantities of gene products as other gene products vary.  Their manipulations consisted in 
insertion of small interfering RNA (siRNA) into cells in vitro, targeted to specific mRNAs.  
SiRNA knocks down its targeted mRNAs in a dose dependent fashion, thus allowing for the 
comparison of responses in varying levels of knockdown.  They represented their results in a 
variety of bar graphs, taken to show the types of responses that were important in 
implementing compensation.  Two are shown below. 
 
Figure 2.  Proportionality patterns in knockdown conditions.  From Baggs et al. (2009). 
The left panel of figure 2 shows that, with increasing levels of knockdown for Cry1 mRNA, 
Cry2 mRNA increases.  But not only does it increase, it does so proportionally—the greater 
the knockdown of mCry1, the greater the increase of mCry2.  Since Cry2 is the paralog of 
Cry1, it performs similar operations at similar targets.  So, as mCry1 is depleted, the rising 
mCry2 level results in the overall level of Cry influence at its targets remaining the same, 
thus allowing for the cell’s overall pattern of rhythmic gene interactions to continue.  
Proportional responses are also important in non-paralogous compensation.  The right panel 
shows the effect of mPer1 knockdown on mRev-erbß and mBmal1.  Rev-erbß is activated by 
Per proteins, and the proteins it codes for inhibit Bmal1.  When mPer1 levels go down, 
mRev-erbß levels go up proportionally.  This in turn produces a proportional decrease in 
mBmal1.  The fact that knockdown of mPer1 should cause mRev-erb levels to go up, and 
that increasing mRev-erb levels should subsequently cause Bmal1 transcription to decrease, 
makes sense given the known operations performed by each part: mPer inhibits Rev-erb, 
whose products in turn inhibit Bmal1.  However, the discovery that each relationship is 
proportional is presented by Baggs et al. as an important further fact in explaining 
compensation.   
It is important for compensation for the following reason: the clock relies on precise 
interacting levels of inhibition and excitation between the positive and negative loops.  
Having the levels of one abnormally higher than the levels of the other would wreak havoc 
on the necessary interplay of inhibition and excitation.  As is evident in the right panel, the 
combined proportional interactions result in a balance between the levels of mBmal1 
(positive loop) and mPer1 (negative loop), hence keeping the interaction between loops 
functioning as normal.  Knockdowns of other components are compensated for according to 
similar principles, inducing no loss of rhythmicity elsewhere in the clock.   
Proportional relationships, as revealed in the bar graphs, are inherently patterns of 
quantitative responses across knockdown conditions.  And, as with the case above, one must 
represent these patterns in addition to the mechanistic organization to understand how 
compensation comes about.  As Baggs et al. summarize: “the clock network combines these 
activator and repressor modules with various forms of proportionality to construct relays that 
generate complex gene expression responses to single gene perturbations” (2009, p. 0570).  
So, it is not only the types of causal interactions that occur (“activator and repressor 
modules”), but also the particular quantitative patterns in which they interact (“forms of 
proportionality”) that explain compensation.  This in turn helps explain how functioning 
rhythms at the cellular level can be maintained despite noisy conditions. 
3.  Patterns as Their Own Category 
3.1.  Patterns are distinct from operations. 
A category is explanatory when representing it shows, perhaps in part, how the 
phenomenon of interest comes about.  In previous work(Burnston, 2016), I argue in detail 
that the explanatory role played by representations of patterns is dissociable from that played 
by representations of operations (e.g., in a mechanism diagram).  I will only summarize these 
arguments here, before moving on to discuss the relationship between patterns and 
generalizations.  The key point to note is that in each of the studies above, the parts, 
operations, and causal organization of the mechanism were already known—neither study 
extends, revises, or modifies the known mechanistic organization.  In each case, however, the 
researchers discovered and represented a set of relationships between quantities in the system 
at specific times and/or across specific conditions.  As such, knowing the relevant facts about 
parts and operations constrains, but does not determine, all of the relevant facts about the 
patterns.  For instance, in discussing the Baggs et al. case I only focused on linear 
proportional patterns of responses, but these are not the only possible ones.  Baggs et al. also 
explore several other types, including proportional relationships with fractional coefficients 
and non-linear responses, which play roles in compensation for other knockdowns.  The 
point is this:  these distinct patterns of relationships are all (epistemically) possible even 
given the known operations performed by each part and the targets they perform them on.  
So, specifying the parts and operations does not give us all of the information we need to 
explain.  We must also represent quantitative patterns.   
3.2.  Patterns are distinct from generalizations. 
Those who are inspired to consider generalizations as fundamental in explanation 
often note that mechanisms comprise causal relations, but causal relations of a certain sort, 
namely ones that are “stable” or “robust” (Leuridan, 2010; Woodward, 2010).  A mechanism, 
the intuition runs, is one that exhibits a stable organization that can produce “regular 
changes” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000) in its environment.  Hence, mechanisms 
depend on generalizations instantiated amongst their parts.  Those who consider operations 
fundamental often point to the shortcomings of generalizations for explaining causal 
relationships between particulars.  It is the activities of particulars, the intuition goes, that 
have effects on other particulars, not whether they instantiate some generalization.  These 
relationships can hold even in statistically unlikely or rare cases—in extreme cases, we could 
want to explain singular events, which only happen once.  Bogen (2005) and Craver and 
Kaiser (2013) take this argument to show that explanations do not depend on relationships 
with a significant domain of invariance or scope, and thus that generalizations only play 
subsidiary epistemic roles, which help us to access the operations that actually explain.   
Patterns of the type I have described, however, are explanatorily distinct from 
generalizations.  The argument involves two claims, one against the generalizationists and 
one against the operationists.  Against the operationists: representing patterns is necessary for 
explanation even in cases of minimal scope or domain of invariance.  Against the 
generalizationists: it is the specific pattern in the relationship, not any specific facts about its 
domain of invariance or scope, which is important for explanation.  Presumably, if it were 
really the case that the explanatory role of a pattern depended on its status as a 
generalization, then that role would be closely related to how wide a scope the pattern has or 
how broad its domain of invariance is.  The following two simple thought experiments show 
this not to be the case.  The first assesses domain of invariance, and the second assesses 
scope.   
The fragile oscillator.  Suppose that we have a system that exhibits the patterns of 
phase relationships shown in the Ueda et al. study, and thus oscillations amongst the gene 
products in its molecular clock.  But it is highly fragile, meaning that there is an extremely 
specific set of conditions that has to hold in order for it to oscillate.  Perhaps the constituent 
proteins are easily broken apart, or the environment is highly volatile, so that even slight 
variations in (say) temperature or PH will modify transcription and degradation rates, 
interrupting the needed patterns and preventing oscillation within the system.  One could 
dress up the example until arriving at a case where the patterns have a minimum domain of 
invariance—that is, in which there is only one set of conditions in which the mechanism will 
oscillate.  In this case wiggling any variable other than the ones mentioned in the pattern will 
prevent the pattern from occurring.  If the explanatory role of patterns were based on their 
having some specific domain of invariance, then they should play a lesser or different 
explanatory role in this case than in a case where their domain of invariance is broader.  This, 
I submit, is not the case.  When we go to explain how this system works, we will need to 
mention both its mechanistic organization and the phase relationships between promoters, 
just as Ueda et al. see fit to do.  But if the explanatory role played by representations of the 
phase relationships is the same in either case, then that role doesn’t depend on its domain of 
invariance.     
  The lonely compensator.  It is important to emphasize here that domain of invariance 
is distinct from scope.  Even if the conditions needed were maximally specific, they could 
occur in many different instances.  To address scope specifically, imagine an opposite case 
from that above, namely an oscillator that was so stable, and existed in such an amenable 
environment, that there were virtually no instances where its gene product quantities varied 
significantly from their normal (oscillating) values.  Now suppose that some cosmically 
unlikely event occurred, whose only effect was to knock Per mRNA quantities away from 
their normal level.  As a matter of historical fact, this has only occurred once, but when it did 
the system compensated, according to the explanation given by Baggs et al.  When giving the 
explanation for what occurred in this system, if Baggs et al. are right, we will need to posit 
proportional patterns of the type I described above (along of course, with the standard 
mechanism schema).  Here, ex hypothesi, we have a phenomenon that occurs only once, thus 
having minimal scope, and yet we still need the representation of patterns in the same 
explanatory role as in our world where compensation is common.  So, the explanatory import 
of patterns does not depend on facts about their scope.   
Both generalizationists and operationists have erred in conflating patterns and 
generalizations.  Against the generalizationists, the explanatory role of patterns does not 
depend on their having scope or domain of invariance.  Against the operationists, they must 
be represented even in highly specific or unlikely cases.  There are likely to be objections 
from each side.  First, generalizationists might insist that, in the thought experiments I’ve 
discussed, the patterns do have a domain of invariance and a scope; it’s just that these are at 
the theoretical minimum.  Hence, they are still generalizations.  Operationists, for their part, 
are likely to suggest that these patterns only “specify key quantities” (to use Bogen’s phrase) 
and that since they do not themselves describe the causal relationships at work, they rely on 
more fundamental descriptions of operations.   
The response to each of these objections is the same: they may make sense as 
metaphysical claims, but don’t tell against the epistemic thesis I am advocating here.  I have 
argued for a particular explanatory role for patterns.  The cases above show that this 
explanatory role of patterns remains the same regardless of any specific facts about scope or 
domain of invariance.  If a generalizationist wishes to insist that any pattern must be a 
regularity on metaphysical grounds, and is willing to bite the bullet of calling the 
relationships discussed in the thought experiments regularities, this does nothing to 
undermine an explanatory distinction between patterns and generalizations.  As for the 
operationist’s response, the discussion in section 2 showed that knowing the relevant facts 
about parts and operations simply doesn’t exhaust the explanation.  There is a particular role 
to be played in representing patterns, and this role must be pursued in addition to listing the 
parts, operations, and organization.  If the explanatory roles are distinct and both necessary, 
then there is no in principle epistemic priority between them (Burnston, 2016).  If 
operationists wish to pursue the fundamentality claim as a metaphysical one, I have no 
quarrel with them, so long as distinct explanatory roles are kept distinct.   
Finally, generalizationists are likely to note that I have leaned on counterfactual 
reasoning in discussing the role of patterns—i.e., if the patterns weren’t instantiated, then the 
phenomenon would not come about.  While generalizations are often thought of as grounding 
counterfactuals, this is different from saying that the explanatory role of a pattern depends on 
its status as a generalization.  As the above has shown, we could make the same 
counterfactual claim regardless of any facts about scope or domain of invariance.  For 
instance, the very same counterfactual holds for proportional relationships in the lonely 
compensator case as holds in the real world where the scope of proportional relationships is 
much greater.  Again, so long as we are talking about the epistemology of explanation, the 
role of patterns should be kept distinct. 
4. Conclusion: Contextualism and Explanation 
I think that the right lesson to draw from the foregoing is that we should distinguish 
between (i) describing the mechanistic organization of a system, (ii) explaining how a 
phenomenon comes about, and (iii) generalizing either (i) or (ii).  In science, each of these 
projects is pursued and they are often pursued in tandem; hence they are often run together.2  
                                                 
2  Craver and Kaiser (2013) clearly distinguish between (i) and (iii), but not between (i) and (ii); this is because 
they miss the distinction between patterns and generalizations, and the important explanatory role played by the 
Keeping them distinct, however, allows us to overcome the question of fundamentality by 
describing the relative roles of operations, patterns, and generalizations in explanation.  
Aspect (i), obviously, involves discovery and representation of parts and operations.  Aspect 
(ii) often involves aspect (i) plus the representation of key quantitative patterns.  The thought 
experiments above show that while aspects (i) and (ii) can be extended to ask questions about 
generalization, they needn’t be.   
When we do turn to generalization, we do so with specific goals and questions in 
mind.  For instance, how widespread phylogenetically is the set of parts, operations, and 
patterns that implements oscillation?  Are other organizations and patterns exhibited 
elsewhere?  At least in terms of mechanistic organization, interacting positive and negative 
feedback loops between genes is extremely common (although the particular components 
differ) across a wide range of phyla.  This fact about scope is an extremely interesting 
generalization, since it clues us in to the central importance of circadian timekeeping for all 
organisms.  Equally important, however, is learning the limits of these generalizations.  One 
of the major discoveries in chronobiology in the last 15 years is that molecular clocks in 
cyanobacteria operate on a post-translational mechanism, rather than on interlocking 
feedback loops of gene regulation (Masato et al., 2005), and hence that the scope of the dual-
loop model is limited.  Similarly, we could want to know about domain of invariance.  For 
instance, what are the conditions for having a well-functioning clock, and how are they 
                                                 
former overtop of describing the relevant parts and operations.  Some of what I say about generalization in this 
section is compatible with Craver and Kaiser’s discussion of the distinction between (i) and (iii). 
compromised in shift-work disorder, familial advanced sleep phase syndrome, jet lag, and 
other circadian interruptions?  One hypothesis is that jet lag is due to disrupted phase 
relationships between cellular clocks in two parts of the mammalian suprachiasmatic nucleus 
(Davidson et al., 2009); hence, in odd lighting conditions the normal phase patterns break 
down and cannot instantiate wild type behavioral rhythms.  These are inherently questions 
that rely on the generalizations surrounding circadian mechanisms, but the importance of 
these questions doesn’t support the fundamentality of any particular category in giving 
explanations.   
What I want to suggest is that there are simply distinct explanatory contexts, and 
which category comes to the forefront depends upon the kinds of questions we are asking.  
For instance, if we are asking what type of causal relationship we are analyzing—what parts 
interact, whether they do so directly, what the results of those interactions are, , etc.—this 
this predisposes the explanation to invoke operations.  When we are interested in how 
phenomena arise from the operations of a mechanism, attention turns to the interplay of 
quantities in the mechanism, and thus to patterns and explanatory relations.  If we are 
interested in the robustness of relationships, then scope and domain of invariance, and hence 
generalizations, come to the fore.  This is a distant cousin of contextualisms about 
explanation that have been advanced before (Van Fraassen, 1983), and while it is not 
currently a popular way of thinking, I suggest that contextualism is the best way to make 
sense of the relationship between distinct categories and their relative explanatory roles.    
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